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Future military forces will face defeat at the hands of a near-peer 
adversary if they do not possess the capacity to act and respond faster 
than a human being. As such, in the interest of national defense, 
technologically advanced nations will develop weapon systems that 
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rely increasingly on artificial intelligence (AI) to effect human 
decisions. These weapons will sense their environment, process inputs 
from this and other data, and respond quicker than their human foes 
are able. Some of the states that create such systems will adhere to the 
idea that the laws of war establish substantive and ideological 
standards that must be adhered to, rather than simply serving as a 
means to an end. During the development of AI-enhanced weapon 
systems, these countries will face the challenge of scrutinizing the 
technology behind how AI effects human decisions. Those charged 
with reviewing the legality of such systems will encounter stark 
contrasts in the predictability of aspects of AI systems as compared to 
legacy systems. As a result, lawyers will need to understand how AI 
arrives at a “decision” and how an AI “decides” differently than 
humans. One of the critical differences is in the description and 
attainment of objective performance standards. This paper explores 
the challenges presented when establishing such standards for AI and 
describes some situations where AI systems could achieve success or 
fall short in hypothetical military applications. It concludes that the 
ability of lethal AI to comply with International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) will depend in part on whether the goals assigned to it are 
amenable to description as numerically quantifiable objective 
standards. 
II. THE DEPENDENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON NUMERICALLY 
QUANTIFIABLE GOALS
A. Background1
The decision to kill may never be functionally delegated to a 
computer. More specifically, evaluating the lawfulness of a use of force 
in the context of armed conflict is by definition a human task. 
Ensuring compliance with the law is a burden that may not be 
abrogated by surrendering such authorities and capabilities that 
humans no longer reasonably control the decision to kill. In the 
process of fielding a weapon system for use in armed conflict, we must 
therefore inquire into “how confidently we can establish in advance 
that a weapon system will kill the intended people or classes of people 
1 This section summarizes relevant points from Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of 
Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems with 
International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 379 (2017). 
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and destroy the intended objects or classes of objects.”2 The precise 
technological manner in which the decision to kill might be 
functionally delegated, however, is difficult to describe with certainty 
because hypotheses on the matter are often intertwined with 
assumptions about how future systems will develop that are shaded by 
institutional bias. It is nevertheless important to describe general 
characteristics of AI that potentially invite functional delegation. One 
such aspect is the capacity of AI systems to achieve certain objective 
performance standards. 
B. Objective Performance Standards
There are endless ways to define, describe, and evaluate AI. In the 
context of examining AI-enhanced weapon systems and whether they 
can comply with the laws of war, however, we are concerned with the 
effects produced by the weapon. The processes by which the system 
arrives at a given outcome are of less concern. Further, holding AI to 
the arguably low standards sometimes demonstrated by humans is 
widely considered insufficient. As such, it should be relatively 
uncontroversial that an AI-enabled weapon must be “evaluated based 
upon how well it performs to rational and objective standards.”3 
Setting a rational standard means we must describe an ideal standard 
to which we expect the system to perform. In this context, an ideal 
standard would fall somewhere in between human performance 
standards and perfection. An objective goal indicates measurable, 
fact-based standards as compared to subjective personal opinions or 
judgment. In the context of an AI-enhanced weapon, however, one 
must pause to further consider the difference between these modes of 
analysis. 
C. Objective Versus Subjective AI?
In the context of reviewing a weapon system, an objective 
standard describes a performance level established as reasonable in 
the eyes of the law as evaluated by those charged with determining 
compliance. This means that when a lawyer evaluates a weapon 
system in order to determine conformity with IHL, she asks whether 
2 Id. at 416. 
3 Id. at 401.  
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the system is per se illegal, and if not, whether a commander could 
reasonably employ it in accordance with the law of war.4 This begs the 
question, however, as to what objective standard of performance is 
reasonably sufficient to comply with the law. It is at least conceivable 
that in the future we may need to design AI that can perform to 
objective standards described at a minute level of detail where we 
delineate precisely which individuals will be killed for the sake of 
achieving military advantage.5 That time, however, has not yet arrived 
and is beyond the scope of this paper. We may therefore sidestep the 
matter and be satisfied that for the time being, AI-enhanced weapons 
will need to perform to a generalized standard that policymakers and 
lawyers collectively decide is objectively reasonable. That is because 
the AI must necessarily attempt to effect human judgment as to an 
objectively reasonable outcome.  
There is no such thing as subjective AI. Computers do not possess 
instincts, values, judgment, or higher consciousness; and they 
probably never will. AI systems may impressively mimic such human 
characteristics, but they only do so as a function of advanced 
programming. When AI finds a coffee shop that is ideal for you, it is 
because the algorithm behind its software is optimized effectively to 
achieve its designated goal. The AI does not care about you or your 
desires or values despite the fact that it may consider those facts when 
arriving at a recommendation. The answer it provides is therefore by 
definition objective because the AI was programmed by humans to 
achieve an established level of performance. The values a system 
places on the inputs it processes in arriving at an output are the result 
of computational statistics. To be sure, the goals established for an AI 
by its programmers may reflect their subjective value judgments, but 
these may not be imputed to the machine. An AI does not value the 
4 Legal reviews of new weapons are conducted as a function of customary international law 
or as mandated by Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. See 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, opened for signature June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201125/volume-1125-i-17512-
english.pdf (“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this 
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting 
Party”) [https://perma.cc/ZPK6-YXVU] (hereinafter API).  
5 See Moral Machine, MASS. INST. OF TECH., (last visited June 21, 2018) 
http://moralmachine.mit.edu [perma.cc/3SB8-TBXT]. 
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accomplishment of assigned goals any more than a sewing machine 
values the quality of the clothes it helps create. AI can achieve 
subjective human standards, but only because it was programmed to 
do so. It does not possess the capacity to “know” the difference. 
Humans, on the other hand, appear at times incapable of 
divorcing their subjective judgment from the consideration of rational 
objective standards. For any student of the law, this becomes painfully 
obvious during schoolhouse discussions struggling through the 
standard of the “reasonable person.” But most of these debates 
arguably center around whether a standard is a reasonable one, not 
whether it is possible in theory to establish standards that most would 
view as objectively reasonable. So we proceed for the sake of 
argument, therefore, that objective standards may be established that 
are viewed by the majority of persons as reasonable.  
Consider for example the requirement pursuant to IHL to ensure 
attacks do not produce disproportionate harm to civilians. Pursuant to 
the principle of proportionality, expected loss of civilian life and 
damage to property incident to an attack must not be “excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”6 
This standard of course begs the question, “What is excessive?” Most 
military leaders would agree that the aerial bombing of an orphanage 
would not be justified simply to eliminate one enemy foot soldier on 
the roof. But a policy on the other end of the spectrum that forbade 
any attack where one civilian might die would ensure defeat of that 
hamstrung military force. Any hypothetical within these two extremes, 
however, inevitably invites endless debate and ultimately results in 
humans “agreeing to disagree.” This does not mean that a rational 
objective standard is unattainable. It simply means we cannot agree 
on where to establish the red line. In the past, there was no imperative 
to set clear standards because the task of deciding what was 
“excessive” was left to military commanders and rarely second-
guessed. Observers have lamented that machines could never possibly 
be able to replicate human decision-making in this realm. There are 
many conundrums to consider in answering this complicated 
question, but a key one amongst them is whether the decision a 
machine is tasked with is the type of decision that machines are adept 
at making on our behalf. An important aspect of the inquiry is whether 
the goal established for an AI is numerically quantifiable. 
6 API, supra note 4, at art. 51(5)(b); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-
BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 46 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
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D. How Decisions Are Delegated to Machines
Generally speaking, the capabilities and limitations of any given 
weapon system depend on what humans empower it to accomplish. 
Machines do not decide to do anything in the human sense.7 They 
follow their programming. But the ways in which machines effect 
human decisions are more complicated than ever. Modern AI is not 
predictable in the way legacy systems were and actions taken by AI 
might evade reverse engineering after the fact. But these problem sets 
are quite different than possessing the free will, for example, to 
redefine goals. 
I argue that the law forbids humans from creating systems that 
have such extensive authority and capabilities that we cannot 
reasonably predict whether they can be employed in accordance with 
IHL.8 Capabilities are comprised by the physical attributes provided to 
the system, such as a vehicle platform, ability to loiter, sensor suites, 
and types of weapons. Authorities are determined by the computer 
programs governing the system, which could range from traditional 
deterministic systems to an advanced deep neural network 
empowered with in situ learning capability. The inquiry regarding AI 
decision-making in this context does not hinge on how much authority 
or how many capabilities we delegate, but instead exactly what 
combinations are provided. 
The authorities granted to an AI-enabled weapon system will 
incorporate goals for the AI to attain, which are described by rational, 
objective standards. For at least the foreseeable future, AI will require 
these standards to be described in a numerically quantifiable 
manner.9 This means that the goals established for the AI are 
amenable to quantitative description. For example, “do not kill more 
than five civilians” is a quantifiable standard, discounting, of course, 
the question of whether the system is capable of distinguishing 
between the status of people on the battlefield. On the other hand, “do 
the right thing” is inherently not a quantitative standard. While we 
could suggest quantifiable goals that might approximate our vision of 
what “the right thing” is, these goals would simply serve as numerical 
proxies for a standard that is by definition qualitative. 
7 See supra note 1, at 388 n.40. 
8 See supra note 1, at 392. 
9 See Interview with Machine Learning Experts, OpenAI, San Francisco, CA (Jan. 26, 
2018). 
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Depending on the goal in question, describing rational objective 
standards in a numerically quantifiable way might be simple or 
impossible. The use of proxy standards to achieve qualitative goals 
could suffice in some situations. Often, reactions to hypothetical AI 
systems are laden with assumptions about the way we believe AI 
might develop as well as our value judgments about what direction it 
should take. The reality is, however, that it will depend on the specific 
tasks we ask the AI to accomplish. The ability of AI-enabled weapon 
systems to comply with IHL will depend in part on whether the tasks 
in question are susceptible to being described as numerically 
quantifiable objective standards. In the following sections, we will 
explore hypotheticals that will examine this concept in greater detail.  
It is worth noting that, by clearly delineating numerically 
quantifiable standards, we may limit the usefulness of AI in military 
applications. Amongst the many advantages that AI potentially 
provides the military is the ability to make completely unpredictable 
decisions at speeds no human can match. If AI systems are only 
employed in situations where they can evaluate easily quantifiable 
factors, they may be so limited as to negate their military advantage. 
For this reason, the tempting and simple answer that AI should not be 
used in difficult-to-quantify environments is unsatisfying.10  
In the sections that follow, we consider two hypotheticals that 
evaluate the application of possible future AI-enabled weapon systems 
in the context of particular IHL rules. The examples are illustrative 
and not exhaustive and do not consider the full panoply of IHL rules 
that might apply to the hypothetical systems. They will serve, 
however, to illuminate some of the challenges faced in translating the 
military application of an AI-enabled weapon into numerically 
quantifiable goals. 
E. Numerically Quantifiable Goals to Attain Rational Objective 
Standards
The ways modern AI systems accomplish goals seem to attenuate 
the link between human decision and machine action. Sometimes 
even AI programmers do not understand, for example, why neural 
10 It is also worth mentioning that all of the hypotheticals in this paper relate to lethal 
weapon system. Without question, AI presents opportunities to ensure our national 
security in non-lethal contexts such as intelligence analysis and information operations, 
but these non-lethal contexts are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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networks operate in the manner they do or how such systems might 
accomplish an assigned goal. Further complicating the matter, 
although humans may define goals for AI, there are certain kinds of 
goals that AI are particularly adept at achieving and others at which 
they perform quite poorly. Taken together, these points invite us to 
explore the kinds of military applications in which AI might fulfill or 
fall short of legal standards.  
As a point of departure, consider the difference in the search 
algorithms powering the websites of Google and YouTube. Both sites 
have search engines that are managed by subsidiaries of Alphabet 
Corporation. But the algorithms behind the two sites are optimized to 
achieve very different results. In short, the goal of Google is to direct 
users to the website that most accurately conforms to what you are 
searching for, while the goal of YouTube is to get users to click on as 
many videos as possible.11 As a result, users may be presented with 
drastically different suggestions depending on which site they visit. 
That being said, both websites provide opportunities for their 
designers to numerically quantify success. For Google, if the user 
clicked on the first result from their search (setting aside entirely the 
issue of advertising) then the AI performed successfully. If the user 
was forced to scroll to later results, the performance was suboptimal. 
For YouTube, success simply means continuous clicks. The more 
clicks, the better the results. But not all goals are as simple to express 
in numerical terms. 
Suppose YouTube was tasked by its leadership to respond to 
search queries with what a user “should” see in response to a given 
input. The computer programmers at YouTube would be faced with 
the task of overhauling their search algorithm in order to return 
videos that reflected the value judgments made by that company as to 
an appropriate response. The most obvious hurdle would be to 
establish what viewers “should” see. For example, if a user types 
“white power forever,” is it YouTube’s role simply to provide the 
obvious but societally discouraging output of extremist videos? Or 
should the website steer users to films intended to eradicate 
xenophobia? This is of course the most thorny and inflammatory 
aspect of the question, which has implications far beyond subjective 
value judgments (and hence the scope of this paper). But the second 
11 Jack Nicas, How YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s Darkest Corners, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-youtube-drives-viewers-to-the-
internets-darkest-corners-1518020478 (contrasting results from the two search engines) 
[https://perma.cc/W929-KHVW]. 
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difficulty encountered when tailoring the AI to achieve this goal is in 
defining success. In other words, how would YouTube know that it 
had accomplished its goal of directing users to the videos that they 
“should” see? While the problem may not be intractable, it is without 
question more complicated than simply “more clicks is better.” We 
could devise standards aimed at approximating success in achieving 
our subjective goals, such as downward trends in the number of 
searches for “white power forever” and related queries. But such 
standards seem like an unsatisfying means to quantify success. Less 
searches for such unsavory topics does not necessarily mean the 
underlying societal issues are resolved. There are simply some goals 
that are difficult to quantify in numerical terms. These are the goals at 
which AI-enabled systems will be less adept at achieving to 
satisfaction. 
III. MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF LETHAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUBJECTIVE IHL STANDARDS
In this section we explore two hypothetical military applications of 
lethal AI. We begin by examining a system that leverages the strengths 
of AI’s ability to target objects based on numerically quantifiable 
standards. The second example delineates another end of the 
spectrum, where AI is likely unable to comply with IHL due to the 
subjective nature of the goals assigned.  
IHL is the lex specialis that governs parties to an armed conflict. 
Its core principles are military necessity, distinction, proportionality, 
and preventing unnecessary suffering. Military necessity means that a 
belligerent may attack targets that are indispensable for defeating the 
enemy so long as they are not otherwise illegal.12 The principle of 
distinction holds that only military targets may be attacked, and 
commanders must proactively determine if potential targets are 
civilians or combatants, and then attack only combatants.13 
Proportionality is a concept that balances unintentional harm to 
12 API, supra note 4, at art. 51(5)(b) (attacks on targets that would produce a “concrete and 
direct military advantage,” and are not otherwise unlawful, are not prohibited); API, supra 
note 4, at art. 52(2) (targets are persons and objects “which by their nature, location, 
purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action” and whose destruction or 
neutralization “offers a definite military advantage.”). 
13 Id. at art. 52(2) (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.”); HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.7. 
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civilians and their property with the military advantage of attacking a 
target. The collateral damage from an attack cannot be clearly 
excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the 
attack.14 The principle of unnecessary suffering prohibits the use of 
weapons that by their nature cause unnecessary suffering and also the 
use of lawful weapons in a manner that is intended to cause 
unnecessary suffering.15 While these principles will not be 
comprehensively evaluated in the following hypotheticals, it is 
important to not overlook the fact that each may present unique 
challenges when applied in the context of lethal AI. 
A. Example One: Quantifying Distinction
An unmanned submarine powered by AI could search for and 
destroy enemy submarines during an international armed conflict. 
Such a system would leverage technology that is already in existence 
or could be produced in the reasonably foreseeable future that 
employs goals, which are numerically quantifiable. Importantly, the 
nature of the operating environment makes applicable legal standards 
simpler to achieve. 
A submarine-hunting platform would rely on multiple 
technologies that take advantage of the strength of AI. It would 
leverage advanced forms of the non-visual object recognition and 
classification systems in use today. The system could process 
intercepts in the form of signals and acoustics similar to the manner 
in which current submarines do. It could also process friendly 
identifiers in order to avoid fratricide as is commonplace among 
modern militaries, but an AI could process all of this information in 
order to arrive at a targeting decision far faster than a human. As 
additional sensor systems are developed that surpass today’s 
technology, the AI will arguably be better suited to incorporate 
voluminous amounts of data into action. These types of data can be 
translated into statistical expressions of certainty. For example, given 
X signals intercepts, Y acoustic signature, Z undersea maneuvers, 
ruling out other identifiers to include sea life and friendly forces, the 
AI produces a result that it is a percentage (of 100 for instance) certain 
14API, supra note 4, at art. 51(5)(b); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.14. 
15API, supra note 4, at art. 35(2)–(3); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra 
note 6, at R.70. 
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that the object it detected is an enemy submarine. If the statistical 
certainty is above a cutoff value established by humans, the AI will 
attack. It could also have other hard rules in place to stop the attack, 
for example if the enemy submarine was in a harbor or in close 
proximity to an unidentified vessel. 
The counter-argument to this type of system is that even if you 
accept all of this as true, it will remain imperative to have a human 
onboard or in communication in order to at least override mistakes by 
the AI. This human interaction comes at a significant cost, however, to 
the overall effectiveness of the system. 
The presence of humans aboard a submarine significantly 
degrades the optimal performance of that platform. Unmanned 
submarines operating with AI would likely be able to outmaneuver 
and destroy manned submarines during future armed conflict at sea. 
First, humans are noisy. A machine that does not need to 
communicate is by definition quieter. Second, humans need to 
breathe and are easily crushed. This means manned submarines 
simply cannot dive as deep as unmanned versions. Depth often means 
survivability and tactical advantage. Third, humans eventually need to 
surface to resupply. An AI does not, at least not at the same intervals. 
Fourth, driving submarines is difficult and if you do it wrong lots of 
sailors die. An AI is simply a machine whose loss is insignificant 
beyond its military utility and dollar value, and this fact encourages 
investment in such systems and possibly reduces cost. Of course, none 
of this means that modern militaries should or will replace all manned 
submarines with unmanned systems, it simply identifies that there is 
an arguably significant military advantage to be gained by the 
development of AI-enabled unmanned submersibles.   
In this hypothetical, the ability of the system to comply with IHL 
and the Law of Naval Warfare is simplified due to the nature of the 
operating environment. There simply are not that many civilians or 
civilian objects operating at the depth of military submarines. 
Consider the IHL principle of distinction. In armed conflict, this limits 
belligerents to attacking targets that are valid military objectives.16 As 
a subset of distinction, the imperative to take precautions in the attack 
requires that a belligerent take active steps to determine whether 
persons are civilians or combatants and to direct operations only 
16 API, supra note 4, at art. 52(2) (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.”); 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.7. 
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against combatants.17 The task of distinguishing combatants from 
civilians in the land domain is challenging. This is especially so in 
cluttered areas such as cities or during conflicts in which the enemy 
intentionally commingles with civilians, which has been the recent 
experience of most of the United States military for well over a decade 
of conflict. But the military who prepares for the last war will lose the 
next one. Distinction in the undersea context is simply not as 
challenging as on land due to the dearth of human presence. As such, 
the likelihood that a miscalculation will kill civilians is 
correspondingly reduced. Further, AI systems in the undersea context 
can be provided the technological capability to distinguish in ways 
that land systems are not currently able. Using signals and acoustics 
as well as other data, an AI could come to a conclusion that was 
statistically reasonable and based on numerically quantifiable data 
points that an undersea contact was an enemy submarine. These types 
of quantifiable factors are more difficult to discern in a cluttered 
urban land context, for example in positively identifying an enemy 
fighter and distinguishing that person from a nearby civilian. As such, 
AI arguably presents opportunities in this realm due to its ability to 
distinguish using numerically quantifiable and rational objective 
standards. Such a system might not ever leave port during actions 
short of international armed conflict, but it could prove decisive in the 
event of naval warfare with a peer competitor.  
B. Example Two: Quantifying Unnecessary Suffering
The IHL prohibition against causing unnecessary suffering 
provides contrast to the previous application of the distinction 
principle. At least in the example above, an AI is faced with making a 
factual determination that will classify contacts as legitimate targets 
or not. Either an underwater object is an enemy combatant’s 
submarine or it is not. In the more complicated context of urban land 
warfare, it is the factual determination of civilian or combatant that is 
currently more difficult for the AI to discern. But in either context, the 
distinction challenge is a binary one that is complicated only by the 
clutter of the operating environment and the ambiguity of human 
behavior. In the undersea context of the submarine hunter, an AI 
might reasonably be able to apply the distinction principle because it 
can detect and analyze objective numerically quantifiable information. 
17API, supra note 4, at art. 57; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.15–21. 
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In the land context the same principle might theoretically apply but 
current technology appears unsuited to make such fine grained 
distinction on its own. The challenge of AI applying the concept of 
unnecessary suffering is different in kind, however, because the 
principle is less amenable to numerically quantifiable rational goals.  
The prohibition against causing unnecessary suffering makes 
unlawful the use in armed conflict of weapons that by their nature 
cause unnecessary suffering and the use of lawful weapons in a 
manner that is intended to cause unnecessary suffering.18 
Importantly, there is no simple objective test to determine whether 
the use of a weapon would constitute unnecessary suffering.19 The first 
aspect of the principle is addressed during legal review of proposed 
weapons and is contextually specific to the system being evaluated. 
The contours of specific prohibitions established by customary law 
and treaty are beyond the scope of this article. As such, this discussion 
will generally focus on the second prong regarding employment of 
weapons already deemed not per se unlawful. 
In theory, the goal of preventing unnecessary suffering is a noble 
one. Most would agree in principle that no more suffering should be 
caused to combatants than is necessary to obtain military victory. In 
application, however, the principle is riddled with subjective 
judgment. Consider two simple examples. First, if a soldier bayonets 
an enemy, does she cause unnecessary suffering if she twists and turns 
the bayonet after stabbing the enemy? Some might argue that the 
additional pain caused by twisting the weapon is simply unnecessary 
as the victim has already been wounded and is most likely out of the 
fight. On the other hand, the soldier is permitted under the laws of 
war to continue attacking until the enemy is dead, assuming the 
enemy does not surrender or is not clearly hors de combat. The action 
of twisting the blade will help ensure a fatal wound to the enemy, and, 
as such, she is arguably well within the law to twist and turn and stab 
again until the enemy is dead. By way of a second example, consider 
the use of an artillery barrage of high explosive rounds mixed with 
white phosphorus shells, commonly referred to as an HE/WP fire 
mission. Some would argue that the combination of these rounds 
creates unnecessary suffering because the white phosphorous causes 
horribly painful burns on enemy soldiers that are exposed to the 
18 API, supra note 4, at art. 35(2)–(3); Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, at ¶ 78; 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.70. 
19 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 271–72 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
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barrage, and that the soldiers could be killed more humanely by using 
only HE rounds or other less painful weapons. On the other hand, the 
employment of HE/WP is highly effective at destroying enemy fuel 
depots because after the HE rounds pierce fuel containers, the WP 
rounds light the exposed fuel on fire and destroys the target far more 
efficiently than one type of round alone. The suffering caused to 
attendant enemy soldiers is arguably an unfortunate byproduct of a 
completely lawful attack. In sum, when one of the core functions of 
the military is to kill human beings during armed conflict, any 
discussion about what suffering is unnecessary is fraught with 
subjectivity.  
These are merely two very simple examples that have plausible 
arguments on both sides. We might spend hours debating them 
without arriving at consensus regarding whether they violate the 
principle of preventing unnecessary suffering. The standard is 
inherently subjective and in application nearly impossible to divorce 
from one’s biases, be they cultural, institutional, or otherwise. As 
such, application of this principle may prove highly problematic for an 
AI because it is less amenable to description in numerically 
quantifiable terms. In other words, it is quite difficult to approximate 
using rational objective goals that are defined by numerical standards. 
Since machines are not capable of forming intent, a more detailed 
inquiry into the matter starts with how AI systems could be deployed 
by humans in a manner intended to cause unnecessary suffering. The 
evaluation would hinge on parsing out that suffering which is a 
byproduct of defeating the enemy from that suffering which is 
excessive, and thus, unnecessary to secure victory. One could of 
course conjure up AI systems that would violate this principle. 
Suppose that a military developed a “Pain Bot” that was designed to 
learn how to kill enemy soldiers as slowly as possible without allowing 
itself to be captured or destroyed. Of course, this would be per se 
illegal, and it would not be created by any country that was dedicated 
to the rule of law and IHL principles. Such a sophomoric example 
aside, the analysis becomes complex.  
Suppose instead that a country developed a robot for deployment 
in urban combat called “Surrender Bot.” It is equipped with a high-
power laser that can cut through an enemy soldier’s body armor. The 
country intends to deploy the robot in close quarters as the first 
system to enter enemy held buildings. One of their objectives in doing 
so is to kill as few enemy soldiers as is necessary in order to achieve 
the most efficient military victory possible, thus encouraging post-
conflict reconciliation. Most notably, the robot is equipped with AI 
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that allows it to learn what employment of its laser is most effective at 
obtaining the surrender of the enemy. The system is trained in a 
laboratory on this goal, but continues to learn in situ on the 
battlefield. Its operators do not know ahead of time which enemy 
soldiers will be targeted or where on the enemy soldiers the AI will 
direct its laser. After deployment, the Surrender Bot proves highly 
effective at compelling enemy forces to surrender. Sometimes it chops 
off the enemy’s legs and other times it kills the enemy instantly by 
shooting them in the forehead. If it detects an enemy leader it 
generally kills that person first. In some instances, Surrender Bot will 
deliberately injure, but not kill an enemy in order to cause that fighter 
to scream and writhe in pain, thus encouraging the surrender of the 
enemy fighters in close proximity, but due to hard programming rules 
the AI never attacks any soldier that has surrendered or is wounded.  
We sidestep the issue of whether Surrender Bot is unlawful per se 
because by its nature it causes unnecessary suffering without 
conceding the matter. That ex ante determination does not implicate 
the ability of the AI to achieve numerically quantifiable goals in the 
operating environment. The second prong of the principle, however, 
requires those designing the AI to describe goals that can be 
quantified in a way that makes them amenable to application by AI. In 
other words, how can we provide the AI with objective standards that 
will enable it to determine when the suffering it creates is unnecessary 
under the circumstances? Given the subjective nature of this analysis 
as delineated above, this task appears a significant challenge. 
Surrender Bot’s designers would be perplexed by multiple and 
competing goals for the system. It would need to be empowered to kill 
the enemy.20 We assume simply for the sake of argument, again 
without conceding the matter, that the AI could detect and identify 
enemy fighters. So this begs the question, “which soldiers should be 
killed?” The AI could be programmed with great discretion in this 
matter (i.e. there is no limit to the number of enemy soldiers that may 
be killed until victory is achieved) or it could be bounded significantly 
in countless ways. For example, it could have a hard rule that the 
enemy must be wounded first and allowed the opportunity to 
surrender, and only killed if they refused to surrender. The next 
question is whether the AI should be limited in the other manners in 
which it can use its laser. Is it allowed to shoot the enemy in the 
20 Other options could certainly include non-lethal means of incapacitating the enemy but 
are thus beyond the scope of this article. 
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kneecaps? In the genitals? As a preliminary matter, it would not be 
allowed to use the laser to blind the enemy soldiers.21 Beyond that 
arguably arbitrary limitation, programmers would need to work with 
lawyers to delineate what kinds of suffering it might create that were 
unnecessary to achieve victory. This process would be a nightmare 
because if the machine is not specifically forbidden by hard rules from 
taking a particular action, we must assume that the AI may use that 
option without any regard for what a human might do under the 
circumstances. Machines do not have common sense, values, morality, 
decency, sympathy, empathy, or any of the other traits that make 
some acts by humans generally less likely. We cannot tell an AI, “do 
the right thing,” or “you will know it when you see it.” So in 
programming the AI, we must attempt to approximate in quantifiable 
terms what we mean by “unnecessary suffering.” Given the subjective 
nature of this principle, that task might prove highly problematic. 
One solution might be to dramatically limit actions the AI could 
take. This simple solution appears elegant at first. The system could be 
designed to either kill instantaneously or wait. It would not be allowed 
to take any other actions, thus sidestepping the question of whether its 
behavior creates unnecessary suffering. But this solution fails entirely 
to leverage the strength of AI. Learning systems can adapt and make 
decisions faster than humans and behave in ways that would be 
unpredictable to the enemy. If their capacity is bound so strictly that it 
becomes highly predictable, the machine becomes deterministic and 
not significantly more useful than legacy systems. It would also 
arguably be less likely to achieve the goal of killing the fewest soldiers 
possible while securing victory. If it defaulted instead to no action, it 
would be less survivable on the battlefield. This kind of system might 
still be useful in achieving military victory, but it would not further the 
goal of preventing unnecessary suffering. 
On the other hand, if the AI was provided broad discretion, we 
must anticipate that it will behave in a way that no human would.22 
Perhaps the AI might learn to target the weapons in the hands of 
21 See Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, opened for signature Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 
U.N.T.S. 370 (entered into force July 30, 1998), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-
30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AXE-CW9M]. 
22 See Jack Clark & Dario Amodei, Faulty Reward Functions in the Wild, OPENAI (Dec. 21, 
2016), https://blog.openai.com/faulty-reward-functions/ (“Reinforcement learning 
algorithms can break in surprising, counterintuitive ways.”) [http://perma.cc/4T3L-P8J3]. 
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enemy fighters. This would be highly desirable, as the AI would 
essentially be able to force the enemy to surrender without causing 
any suffering. Alternatively, the AI might learn to surgically slice off 
small portions on multiple parts of the enemy soldiers’ body, causing 
extreme pain and incapacitating enemy soldiers and forcing their 
surrender. Or it might lobotomize them all. We simply could not 
assume that any option was off the table for the system unless we 
programmed it to be off the table. 
Even more to the true dilemma, equipping the system to make 
determinations on its own as to what suffering was unnecessary in the 
absence of hard rules seems intractable for the foreseeable future. The 
challenge of approximating subjective standards for unnecessary 
suffering through hard programming boundaries pales in comparison 
with attempting to equip AI with the capability of establishing 
suffering as unnecessary on its own. As described above, machines do 
not possess any of the human characteristics that underpin our 
desires to limit the suffering of others. As such, if the AI was 
programmed to determine what suffering was unnecessary, it would 
need numerically quantifiable goals that quantified suffering and 
established limits in relation to military objectives. This would 
arguably be more complicated to quantify than decisions as to the 
proportionality of attacks23 because there is no clearly established 
benchmark against which to weigh the suffering of the enemy. 
Suffering is omnipresent in armed conflict. Every military attack 
causes considerable suffering, the contours of which defy simple 
definition. Minor suffering could be unnecessary while massive 
suffering could be well justified under IHL. Under the circumstances 
described, it appears that AI will be poorly suited to the task of 
evaluating suffering on its own for the foreseeable future. As such, 
those designing AI-enabled weapon systems will need to be aware of 
this limitation and account for it during the design of the system. 
IV. CONCLUSION
AI is a highly technical field that has seen dramatic advances as 
well as wildly overoptimistic visions for its future. It is a safe 
assumption that future military forces will need to leverage the power 
23 Proportionality under IHL means that the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to 
property incidental to attacks must not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.” API, supra note 4, at art. 51(5)(b); HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at R.14. 
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of AI in order to dominate the battlespace, whatever form that 
technology takes. While the law may not need to adapt to AI, lawyers 
applying the law must understand the technology involved more 
deeply than perhaps was necessary in the past. For the lawyer who 
applies the law without respect to the facts provides no service to his 
client. 
Further, we must evaluate every weapon system under 
development and during legal review on its particular facts and 
merits. Sweeping statements about whether AI-enabled weapon 
systems will be able to comply with IHL do little to further informed 
discourse on the subject. Some systems we could design today with 
advanced AI incorporated in significant ways will be perfectly lawful. 
Other concepts are simply incongruent with the strengths and 
limitations of AI. As lawyers continue to develop expertise in AI, we 
will be better equipped to facilitate processes that will make these fine 
grain distinctions. This expertise will be integral to ensuring national 
security as well as adherence to the rule of law and humanitarian 
ideals. 
  
 
